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Summary findings
In the past decade a sea change has taken place in trade  Paradoxically, the intense liberalization in recent years
policies in Latin America: within a few years, most of the  has made it less likely that such agreements would be
region's economies have changed from restrictive to  beneficial - except possibly for agreements between
open policies. But unlike trade liberalization in Europe,  some countries and Brazil, Mexico, or (to a lesser extent)
most trade barriers in Latin America have been reduced  Argentina.
unilaterally. Recently bilateral or multilateral agreements  When the level of tariffs and nontariff barriers is
have been considered, especially preferential trade  already low, a preferential agreement is more likely to
agreements within the region.  have an adverse impact than a beneficial one (although in
Michaely evaluates the relevance and desirability of  any case only a slight impact). Between countries, the
multilateral free trade agreements (such as NAFTA) for  patterns of exports and imports are similar, suggesting a
the Latin American continent  and the Caribbean, with an  potential for trade diversion.
emphasis on how they affect trade flows. Is a preferential  Most countries would benefit from a preferential trade
trade agreement among some Latin American countries  agreement with the United States, however. And U.S.
more or less likely to be meaningful than others - agreemenits  with blocks of Latin American countries are
important in intensity of impact, or beneficial, or both?  no more beneficial to those countries than are U.S.
The evidence strongly suggests little likelihood that  agreements with individual countries.
these  agreements will succeed in Latin America.
This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America  and the Caribbean Regional  Office.  The study was
funded by the Bank's Research  Support Budget  under research project "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion  in Latin America"
(RPO 679-38).Copies  of this paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please
contact  Demetris  Papageorgiou,  room  18-441,  telephone  202-473-1910,  fax  202-676-9271,  Internet  address
dpapageorgiou@worldbank.org.  March 1996. (55 pages)
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In the last decade a sea change has taken place in the nature of trade policies in Latin
America:  within a few years, most of the region's economies  have turned from following
the most restrictive policies to becoming among the world's most open.
Unlike other major trade liberalizations-say, in Europe-unilateral  reductions of
trade barriers have been the overwhelming  avenue of each country's policies.  Recently,
however, policies determined  by bilateral  or multilateral  agreements have been contemplated;
specifically, preferential trade agreements  within the region.  Several agreements of this
nature have long been in existence, going through cycles of concrete activity and dormancy,
whereas others are more recent enterprises. By far the most important, in terms of expected
trade flows, is NAFTA, the recently-completed  free-trade agreement between the U.S.,
*  The research  presented  in this  paper  has been  supported  by the World  Bank  Research
Committee  (RPO  679-38),  and has been  carried  out  under  the auspices  of the Latin  America  and
Caribbean  Region. I am most  grateful  to Demetris  Papageorgiou,  whose  deep  involvement  makes
him a defacto partner  to this research;  to Gary  S. Hufbauer  and Moshe  Syrquin  for helpful  comments
and suggestions;  and  to the participants  in a seminar  at the World  Bank,  whose  discussion  has led to
numerous  modifications  and  clarifications.  Kyle  Kelhofer  and Patricia  Langoni  have  provided
skillful,  resourceful  and  diligent  research  assistance.Canada, and Mexico: even just in terms of Mexico's trade flows with the U.S. (and, to a
much lesser extent, with Canada), this agreement  is concerned  with a substantial  fraction of
Latin America's trade.  Other trade agreements,  purely within LAC, are MERCOSUR-the
agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; the Andean Pact-an  only
partially effective agreement  between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela;  the
Central America Common  Market (CACM), a once-active,  now semi-revived agreement of
Central America's countries (Cost Rica, El Salvador,  Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua);
CARICOM-a  free trade agreement  of the Caribbean  countries; and a bilateral agreement
between Colombia and Venezuela  which has been expanded  to include Mexico.  Beyond
these agreements, many other possibilities  have been frequently  discussed in the Continent,
such as the expansion  of NAFTA by accession  of individual  LAC countries; the expansion of
MERCOSUR;  the accession  of MERCOSUR,  as a bloc, to NAFTA; and several other
variants of bilateral or multilateral  arrangements. In general, a feeling is now prevalent that
having gone so far through the unilateral route, multilateral free-trade agreements should now
become  the focus of the trade liberalization  process in Latin America.
The present paper is an attempt  to address the issue of relevance and desirability of
this route for the Latin American and Caribbean  continent  (we shall use the acronym LAC,
and sometimes,  just for convenience,  Latin America, to represent this continent).'  Since a
good part of the discussion  is concerned  with the relationship  of LAC countries with
NAFTA, or just with the U.S., we shall add the U.S., and on occasion  Canada, into our
observations; but the trade relationships  between  these two North American countries are not
1  . See References  at the end for, inter alia, several other recent studies  of this issue.- 3 -
part of our subject matter, nor shall we look at any arrangement from the point of view of
these two countries.  We shall be concerned  only with economic rationale  and economic
impact-ignoring  political considerations  pro and con, which are often given the most weight
in deliberations of policy makers.  Moreover, among economic  considerations,  we shall
confine ourselves to the effects on and of trade flows.  We shall only briefly mention,
towards the end, the relevance of other impacts (such as on investment)  which are ignored in
this study.  Finally, we shall confine our observations  to free-trade-areas  (FTAs) rather than
address customs unions:  the latter, unlike the former, include the establishment  of common
external tariffs on non-partners-an element that will not be discussed  in this paper.
Although we shall rely heavily-almost exclusively-  on quantitative  indicators, we
aim to reach a qualitative assessment. That is, we shall attempt to form an ex ante
judgement on whether a trade preferential agreement  among some countries  within the Latin
American region is more or less likely to be meaningful  than another-either  important, in
the intensity of its impact, or beneficial, or both.  But we shall not try to get any quantitative
approximations  of expected welfare changes; nor shall we try to project the effect of one
agreement or another on magnitudes  such as trade flows, rates of economic  growth,
employment, or similar performance  variables. 2
B.  The Effects of Preferential  Agreements  - A Priori Considerations
We know that a bilateral free-trade agreement  of a country, or a multilateral
preferential agreement, may be of little or of much relevance.  When relevant, it may be
2.  For recent studies that do attempt  such projections,  see Hufbauer and Schott (1994), or Primo Braga
and Yeats (1992).- 4 -
either beneficial  or harmful to the economy-increasing or reducing its welfare.  Following
the old tradition set by Viner and Meade, the impact  of a preferential agreement on the trade
flows and, through them, on welfare may be classified into trade diversion,  trade creation,
and consumption  effect.  The agreement will be more relevant the larger is either of these
three impacts. The first, trade diversion, works to lower the economy's welfare; the second
and the third, trade creation and the consumption  effect, work to raise welfare. 3
In general, all of these effects are in operation, so that any outcome is conceivable.
But a-priori considerations  are a bit more helpful than just leading us to such a statement
(although even going that far-recognizing  that a preferential trade agreement may well lead
to a net loss to the economy-was not a mean achievement). Specifically,  we know, on a-
priori grounds, that the likelihood of a benefit rather than a loss (or of a larger benefit, once
there is one) is higher: 4
(i)  The higher is the level of the pre-union  (uniform) tariff in the home country.
This is the foremost criterion, and several others follow-at  least partly-from
it.  As we shall see later, it is also of great significance  for Latin America
today.  It may, therefore, deserve a word of elaboration.  If trade  creation
occurs following the preferential agreement, it will be larger, and more
beneficial (per unit of increased  imports), when the price differential  between
the home production and the partner's (potential)  export (the cheaper source) is
larger; and this, in turn, would be made possible  by a higher (pre-union) tariff
3.  Viner (1950) and Meade (1955).
4.  See Lipsey (1960) and Michaely (1977), Ch. 6, for analyses of the issue.- 5-
rate.  The loss (per unit) from trade diversion, on the other hand, should this
take place, is a function of the price differential  between the two foreign
"countries" (the partner and the rest of the world), which is independent of the
home country's tariff level.  Moreover, the size of potential trade diversion
would be small with a high tariff level in the home country, since its level of
trade would then be low and there would not be much trade to divert (this will
also appear later as a separate  consideration). In addition, a pre-union high
tariff level, implying a large gap between the foreign and the domestic prices,
would lead to a larger (and necessarily  favorable)  consumption  effect when
removed.
(ii)  The higher is the tariff level of the partner country.  This is self-evident:  a
removal of a higher tariff facing the home country's exports would lead to a
larger expansion of exports and a larger gain from each unit of such expansion.
(iii)  The smaller is the size of imports from the non-partner world:  the smaller this
is, the smaller is the potential  for trade diversion.
(iv)  Given the aggregate size of the country's pre-union imports, the higher is the
proportion of imports from the partner country.  This is a corollary of the
preceding argument, describing a situation of a smaller potential for trade
diversion.
(v)  The closer the relative prices in trade with the partner country are to those
prevailing in the rest of the world.  This is another fundamental
consideration, from which much of the rest follows. In the extreme case, in
which the partner's prices (in sales to the home country, and assuming the- 6 -
latter is "small") are equal to those of the rest of the world, there is no
potential whatsoever for a loss from trade diversion; whereas the potential for
gain from trade creation is at the maximum. In this extreme case, a
preferential agreement with the partner country is in substance  equivalent to
an "agreement"  with the world as a whole-a  complete, universal opening of
the economy.
(vi)  The larger  is the economic size of the country's  partners to the
agreement-whether it is due to the number of partners or to the economic
size of each (where economic size is a representation of an economy's
product-its  GDP-and  its trade).  The larger the economic  size of a country,
the more likely it is that relative prices in it would not be unique but would
resemble those of the rest of the world.
(vii)  The more diversified is the structure of the country's partners to the
union-again,  whether this is due to the number of countries  joining the union
or to the degree of diversification  of economic  structure of each.  The
rationale is similar to that just indicated  in the preceding considerations. In
fact, the criteria suggested  under the last three headings ((v) to (vii)) may be
combined under the following  heading:
(viii)  The less unique is the partner, that is, the more it resembles the part of the
world excluded from the preferential agreement. The probability of the
partner having indeed such an attribute will be higher the larger is the
economic  size of the country's partners, and the more diversified their
economic structure.- 7 -
A partly-related, but separate, question is the following: Under what circumstances
is a trade-preferential agreement likely to be-for  better or for worse-more  relevant in its
impact on trade flows, production, and consumption;  that is, when are trade creation
(positive  welfare effect), trade diversion (negative)  or the consumption  effect (positive)
likely to be larger?  By and large, the criteria for relevance  are similar to the criteria for the
likelihood  of a positive impact; but they are obviously not identical: a larger size of trade
diversion would make an agreement relevant,  but possibly not beneficial!  After the earlier
discussion, the criteria for relevance may be presented in a more concise manner.  A
preferential agreement is more likely to be relevant (a) the higher is the home country's
tariff level prior to the agreement; (b) the higher is the tariff level of the partner; (c) the
larger is the economic size of the partner; (d) the more diversified  are the partner's exports;
and (e) the more diversified are the home country's own exports.
With these considerations  as a framework, we shall turn now to the analysis of the
concrete circumstances  in the economies  of Latin America.
C.  Tariff Levels in Latin America
As we have noted at the outset, tariff levels among Latin American countries have
gone down dramatically in recent years.  The process of (sustained)  trade liberalization
started in Chile, in fact, already in the mid-1970s; but it was then an isolated event.  In the
mid-1980s, a more widespread  development  started to take place, beginning with
Mexico-the  most important case-and  Bolivia.  By the late 1980s and early 1990s the
process engulfed almost the whole of Latin America, notably Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. It consisted  of drastic reductions of tariff levels- 8 -
and, perhaps even more importantly,  the almost complete  elimination of the previously
predominant non-tariff barriers.  Data about the latter are, by their nature, hard to get, and
we thus cannot present here any quantitative  estimates. But we know that before the start of
the liberalization  process, almost all imports, in almost all Latin American  countries had
been subject to non-tariff barriers; whereas at present, their existence  is almost universally
confined to trade in agricultural products.
For tariff levels, knowledge  of dispersion  as well as of averages is required.  For the
purpose on hand, one would preferably have data of tariff levels applying  to goods that are
traded (actually or potentially) among LAC countries; but the necessary  data are not readily
available. 5 Hence, we can present here only general tariff levels for most Latin American
countries.  This is done in Table 1, which shows  data for a recent year in each country-as
close to the present as is available-as  well as for a year prior to the time in which the
process of liberalization  has started.
We can easily see that, first, tariff levels are now only a fraction, sometimes  quite
small, of what they had been prior to liberalization;  and that they are very low today,
almost universally (although, we know, low average levels may once-in-a-while  conceal
individual  tariff rates which may still be pretty high, particularly when effective protection
is concerned).  This would mean that, by and large, the tariff level of the home country is
low; and, at the same time, that the partner's  tariff level is low, when the potential partner
is another Latin American country or a group of countries.  We should add to it that the
5.  See Annex 1 for an approach to this issue.Table 1:  1Triffs  in Latin America: Pre-Reform  and Recet  Levels
Average ariff Levl  Range of Twff  Schedule
(Arithn  ,  (Mm. - Ma.)
Unweighted)
Country and Pariod  Dellnition  Pre-  Recent  Pre-  Recent
Reform  Reform  _
Argentina (1987, 1991)  42  15  15-115  5-22
Bolivia' (1985, 1991)  20  8  0-20  5-10
80  21  0-105  0-65
Brazil (1985, 1992)  35  11  35  11
Chile' (1984, 1991)  83  12  0-220  5-20
Colombia (1984, 1992)  92  15  1-100  5-20
Costa Rica (1985, 1992)  50  18  0-290  2-40
Ecuador (1985, 1991)  50  19  1-100  5-20
Guatemala (1985, 1992)  NA  20  NA  0-45
Jamaica (1991)  34  4  0-100  0-20
Mexico (1985, 1991)  72  16  0-44  3-86
Paraguay (1985, 1991)  64  15  0-120  5-25
Peru (1987, 1992)  32  18  10-55  12-24
Uruguay (1987, 1992)  37  19  0-135  0-50
Venezuela  (1989, 1991)
'  For Bolivia and Chile, the earlier years too are post rather than Pe  reform.
Sources:  Edwards (1993), Ch. 5, Table  5.2
Primo  Braga, Safadi and Yeats (1994), Table 1;
These sources have drawn  partly on Erzan et.al.  (1989)  and on Alam and Rajapatirana (1993)- 10-
average  tariff level is low (in this case, it has been so for many years) also in the
U.S.-another  potential  partner for preferential  agreements with Latin American countries.
This-recalling  our a priori grounds (i) and (ii) above-leads  us immediately  to an
important inference, namely: unless indicated  otherwise by other criteria, a strong  prima
facie presumption exists that preferential  trade agreements among Latin American countries
are not likely to yield positive results or to be relevant-less  likely, that is, than in other
places or at other times.  This inference  may be viewed as a bit paradoxical  and counter-
intuitive-it  certainly differs from what appears to be today the conventional  wisdom.  It is
stated quite often now that trade preferential agreements in Latin America are contemplated
at present as part of the opening-up  process, an extension  of liberalization;  and hence, by
inference, that they are good.  Whereas  in the past-mainly  in the 1960s-preferential
agreements in the continent (e.g., the original Andean  Pact, or the Central-American
Common  Market)-had  been conceived  as an extension  of the trade-restrictive,  import-
substituting  regime, and as such must have been, by inference, harmful-the  regime itself
being so.  Although such statements  about intentions  and atmosphere  are certainly correct,
in fact the outcome is quite the opposite; other things being equal, preferential trade
agreements in Latin America prior to the process of liberalization  were more likely to yield
a positive impact than preferential agreements  would be today 6 (but that does not mean, by
itself, that past agreements had indeed  had a positive consequence!).
6.  This inference is restricted to the trade  aspect: past agreements  pertained also to determination of
comparative  advantage, a pattern of specialization,  and allocation of investment-a highly damaging component
which, fortunately, would not form a part of any agreement  contemplated  at present.  It should also be noted
that the past levels of common  external tariffs-an  element abstracted from in the present analysis-were  much
higher than any levels that may follow preferential  agreements  which are contemplated  today.- 11 -
D.  Shares of Intra-Regional  Trade
We recall that, given any size of a country's trade, a trade-preferential agreement is
likely to be more relevant and to lead to less trade diversion and more trade creation the
higher is the share of imports from the potential partner.  Similarly, a higher share of
exports to the partner would be beneficial,  contributing  more to an improvement of the
country's terms of trade following  the removal of tariff by the partner.  The share of trade
with the partner is thus an important consideration  in pre-judging the likelihood  of a
beneficial agreement.
Table 2 shows the shares of each Latin American country, as well as the U.S., as a
provider of imports of each other Latin American country and as a buyer of its exports.  Its
results are quite revealing.
Overall, the share of any single Latin American  country in the trade of another is
always low.  Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Mexico, are the only two countries in Latin
America trade with which is of any importance  to any other Latin American country.  But
even here, the highest observed ratios, in Uruguay's and Paraguay's trade with Brazil, are
only of the order of 20-25 per cent (of these two countries' exports or imports).  Other than
in trade with Brazil, Bolivia's trade with Argentina is the only case in which a trade flow
from one Latin american country to another exceeds 10 per cent of either country's trade;
even ratios above 5 per cent are not common.
Even in observing the share of the whole of Latin America in the trade of each
individual country in the group, the role of the continent  does not look impressive-the  trade
shares being moderate at best.  They are distinctly  higher than all the rest-around  40-45
per cent, for each country's trade flows-for  Bolivia and Paraguay.  Perhaps not- 12 -
coincidentally,  these are the two landlocked  countries in the Continent. This raises the
probability that the trade flows in question involve to a large extent transit trade, rather
than transactions originating from the partner country's producers and consumers.
Naturally, if the aggregate share of Latin America is generally  low, so would afortiori  be
the shares of sub-groups within it.  In Table 2, the sub-groupings  that at present have some
measure of preferential agreements  are shown: MERCOSUR  (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay); the Central-American  Common  Market (CACM-Costa  Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua);  and the Andean Pact (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Venezuela). The pattern appearing here is not much different from that emerging
from the observation of single countries as partners.  MERCOSUR,  dominated  by Brazil, is
the only group trade with which is of significance  to some countries: to Bolivia and to
Paraguay, the same two countries discussed  earlier, and to Uruguay-itself a member of
MERCOSUR  (as is Paraguay).  Uruguay's trade with its two large neighbors, Brazil and
Argentina, is in fact the only case in Latin America in which trade with the country's
irnmediate  neighbors is of cardinal importance. The Central American grouping becomes
more important than any of its components  for El Salvador and Guatemala, whose trade
with the CACM is of some significance. From the point of view of outsiders contemplating
joining an existing grouping, Bolivia's relationship  with MERCOSUR  is the only one which
appears, by the yardstick on hand, to be of some relevance.
As an aside, it may be noted that following  the establishment  of the MERCOSUR,  a
significant  change in the geographical  pattern of trade of its members  has taken place,
namely:  a substantial  increase in the share of trade within the bloc.  This is shown in
Table 3.Table 2:  Shares of Intra-Regional Trade in Latin America. 1991
(Trade flow  of  countiry  in column  to or from country  in row,
in percentage  of aggregate  trade  flows  of the former)
ARG  aOL  BRA  CEL  COL  CRI  ECU  SLY  GThI  END  JAM  MIX  NIC  PRY  PER  URY  VEN  ILAC  Tot  MERCO ICACM  ANDIA  IUSA
__  mx  X  MX  M  N  X  MX  MX  NI  X  -M  X  MX  NX  MX  MX  M  X  -MX  P  X  M  XMX  MX  MX  M  x  M  X  MX  -
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Table 3:  Shares of Trade within MERCOSUR, 1988-1993
Percentage of Trade with MERCOSUR in
Exports  imports
Country  1988  1992  1993  1988  1992  1993
Argentina  9.6  19.1  28.1  21.6  23.4  25.1
Brazil  4.7  7.9  13.9  7.3  11.8  12.7
Paraguay  30.4  41.7  39.6  43.0  32.7  37.5
Uruguay  24.3  36.2  41.2  42.5  43.9  44.9
Source: Based on data from Comtrade, U.N. Statistical  Office- 15  -
The large trade flows within MERCOSUR  are, obviously,  those between Brazil and
Argentina. These flows have increased  materially during the last few years.  Explaining it
by the establishment  of MERCOSUR  may not be done without some further research; but a
strong presumption of at least a partial relationship  may exist.  Another explanatory  factor
must be the opening of the two economies-regardless of the preferential agreement-which
has led to the expansion  of trade of the two economies  and hence to each becoming a more
important  trader with the other. 7
The low levels in intra-regional  trade flows in Latin America are, undoubtedly,
primarily a consequence  of the small size of trade of most countries.  This is recorded in
Table 4.
It may be seen that even trade of the largest countries-Brazil and Mexico-barely
reaches one percent of world trade.  For most countries, the share is below one quarter of
one percent.  It might have been expected  that geographical and cultural proximity would
have made trade among Latin American  countries substantially  more important that their
shares in world trade would indicate. But this tends to be outweighed  by structural
attributes of production and trade of these economies, to which we now turn.
7.  See Annex  2 for a methodologicial  discussion  of this issue.-16_
Table 4:  Shares of Trade of Latin American Countries  in World Trade
[MPORTS-1991  EXPORTS-1991
Size of  Percentage of  Size of  Percentage  of
Country  Imports (Sb.)  World Imports  Country  Exports  World Exports
ARGENTINA  8.28  0.25%  ARGENTINA  11.97  0.39%
BOLIVIA  0.99  0.03%  BOLIVIA  0.90  0.03%
BRAZIL  22.98  0.70%  BRAZIL  31.62  1.03%
CHILE  7.45  0.23%  CHILE  8.96  0.29%
COLOMBIA  4.97  0.15%  COLOMBIA  7.27  0.24%
COSTA  RICA  2.23  0.07%  COSTA RICA  1.63  0.05%
ECUADOR  2.33  0.07%  ECUADOR  2.85  0.09Ye
EL SALVADOR  0.88  0.03%  EL SALVADOR  0.37  0.01%
GUATEMALA  1.85  0.06%  GUATEMALA  1.20  0.04%
HONDURAS  0.96  0.03%  HONDURAS  0.62  0.02%
JAMAICA  1.70  0.05%  JAMAICA  1.05  0.03%
MEXICO  38.07  1.15%  MEXICO  26.96  0.88%
NICARAGUA  0.67  0.02%  NICARAGUA  0.27  0.01%
PANAMA  1.69  0.05%  PANAMA  0.34  0.01%
PARAGUAY  1.46  0.04%  PARAGUAY  0.74  0.020/e
PERU  2.81  0.09YO  PERU  3.09  0.10Ye
URUGUAY  1.55  0.05%  URUGUAY  1.57  0.05%
VENEZUELA  10.04  0.30%  VENEZUELA  15.13  0.490/O
........................................  . ..........  ...............  . ......  ...  ......  . _.__... . ....  ..............................  ...........  ........................  ....  .......  ..
LAC TOTAL  110.93  3.36%  LAC TOTAL  116.53  3.53%
USA  508.94  15.43%  USA  400.98  13.07%
WORLD  3,297.90  100.00%/o  WORLD  3,068.46  100.00%/o
Source:  Comtrade,  U.N. Statistical Office and Michaely,  M. (1994)- 17 -
E.  Diversity of Economies
An economy may, as a rule, be expected to be highly diversified when it is highly
developed, in the sense of having a high level of per capital product; and in particular - a
closely related attribute - when it is mostly engaged in manufacturing,  rather than in primary
production.  8
Table 5 presents the shares of agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, as well as the
levels of per-capita income, for the Latin-American  countries and the U.S.A.  Most Latin-
American economies  are quite similar in per-capita income, sharing a moderately  low
level-within  the range of $1,000-$3,000  per year, contrasting with a level of $23,000 for
the U.S. (and a roughly similar level for other highly-developed  economies). The majority
of Latin American economies  also display a relatively large role of the primary
sectors-agriculture  and mining.  But the "minority" consists of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Peru, and Uruguay-a  group of countries that accounts  for most of the continent's income
and trade: in these, the manufacturing  sector provides roughly 70 per cent of the production
of goods, versus a range of some 25 to 55 per cent for the rest. Not surprisingly, those
countries (excluding  Peru) also enjoy the region's higher per-capita income levels.  They
also tend to be (here Uruguay is the exception)  the region's larger economies, in terms of
population  and aggregate income levels, as we shall see soon.  Judged solely by this
criterion, this would be the list of Latin-American  countries which may be considered as
8.  In fact, part of the diversification  which is normally  an element of development  is the increased size
and proliferation of a variety of services. We ignore these in the present context since most of the services are
predominantly  non-tradable, whereas  the economic  relationships  which are relevant for the purpose on hand are
those which concern only tradable activities.-18-
| able 5:  Per-Capita  Income and Shares of Major Sectors, 1992
Per-Capita  Percentage  in Aggregate
Annual GDP  Production  of Goods
|  ($)  Agriculture  Minng  Manufacturing
Argentina  6,050  22.9  5.8  71.3
Bolivia  680  53.9  18.6  26.5
Brazil  2,770  23.5  4.5  72.0
Chile  2,730  20.2  36.8  43.0
Colombia  1,290  38.0  14.0  48.0
Costa Rica  2,000  45.8  0  54.2
Ecuador  630  31.5  21.6  46.9
El Salvador  1,170  43.9  0.5  55.5
Guatemala  980  62.2  0.7  37.1
Honduras  580  56.0  4.0  40.0
Jamaica  1,340  20.1  24.9  54.9
Mexico  3,470  20.6  8.6  70.8
Nicaragua  410  61.3  1.1  37.6
Panama  2,440  61.7  0.4  37.9
Paraguay  1,340  63.2  1.0  35.8
Peru  950  20.5  5.5  73.9
Uruguay  3,340  32.0  0.4  67.6
Venezuela  2,900  18.8  31.1  50.2
U.S.A.  23,120
Source: World Bank data- 19  -
promising partners to a trade-preferential  agreement. Obviously,  the U.S. is, by this
criterion, a more promising partner than any Latin-American  economy.
By the same token, it appears that with the exceptions  noted above, multiplication  of
the number of partner countries, within the region of Latin America, is not going to add
much to diversity of the "partner" bloc.  That is, a low measure of diversification  within
one (partner) country is not going to be compensated  by variations among (partner)
countries, which might have made the "partner" bloc diversified  despite the absence of
diversity in each of its components. We shall come back soon to other representations  of
this nature of the economies.
The economic size of a country is, we recall, another indicator of whether it is likely
to be diversified; to resemble, in its structure other economies; and, hence, to be a
promising candidate in conferring the benefits of trade creation.  The single best yardstick
for "economic size" is a country's aggregate value of income or production.  Table 6
presents the GDP of Latin America's economies, along with that of the U.S.A.
It is imnmediately  apparent that the size of most Latin-America's  economies  is very
small indeed.  In only three of them does the country's share in world GDP reach one
percent or exceed it: Brazil (about 2 percent of world income); Mexico (about 1.4 percent);
and Argentina (close to 1 percent).  The combined share of all the rest of Latin America
reaches only about one percent.  It thus appears that only a "partner" grouping to a trade
agreement which includes Brazil, Mexico and Argentina would have an economic size of
some significance; and that any grouping which does not include at least one of these three,
particularly either Brazil or Mexico, would have a minute economic size, and would have
little promise of any trade creation.-20-
Table  6:  Shares of Latin America's Economies in World  Income,  1992
Aggregate Annual GDP  Percentage of
Country  ($b.)  World GDP
Argentina  200  .98
Bolivia  5  .02
Brazil  425  2.05
Chile  37  .18
Colombia  45  .21
Costa Rica  6  .03
Ecuador  12  .05
El Salvador  6  .03
Guatemala  10  .05
Honduras  3  .01
Jamaica  3  .01
Mexico  285  1.41
Nicaragua  1  .01
Panama  6  .03
Paraguay  6  .03
Peru  21  .14
Uruguay  10  .05
Venezuela  59  .26
U.S.A.  5,904  28.50
MERCOSUR  641  3.41
CACM  26  .13
Andean Group  142  .71
Source: Data from  the World Bank Atlas- 21 -
In contrast, of course, the U.S. income is a full one-fourth of the world's income.
By this criterion, a preferential agreement with the U.S., or with any grouping which
includes the U.S.9, would seem to have a high potential  for trade creation.
F.  Indices of Compatibility
We shall now try to assess the potential impact  of trade-preferential  agreements in
Latin America with the help of two synthetic indices. They represent, in essence, a
combination  of several of the structural attributes  of trade and production we have discussed
thus far.  The use of such indices cannot,  nor is it meant to, yield an inference of a
cardinal nature, (such as the expected size of trade, or trade diversion or creation),
following one agreement or another; nor, for that matter, will they tell whether the
agreement is expected to be "good" or "bad".  They will, on the other hand, provide an
ordinal inference (even that, of course, only in a partial way, as one of several indicators):
we shall infer from them whether one agreement makes more sense than another, either in
comparing potential agreements  of Latin America  or when another agreement, outside the
region, is used as a yardstick.
9.  The share of NAFTA countries (the U.S., Canada and Mexico) in world GDP was roughly 30 per cent
in 1992.- 22 -
We shall use three indices of compatibility, defined in the same way." 0 First  is the
compatibility of a home country's imports with the potential partner-country  exports.
This is defuied as:
Smx  =  1-  '
Jk  2
and
S5C,Mk  =  1- 
where
Smjfxk  =  index of compatibility of imports of country j with exports  of country
k;
Sxjnlk =  index of compatibility of exports of country j  with imports  of country
l  l  indicates absolute values (i.e.,  regardless of sign)
xij;=  share of good i in total exports of country j;
mi  =  Share of good i in total imports of country j;
x&k =  share of good i in total exports of country k;
mik  =  Share of good i in total imports of country k;
10.  Ihese indices are another variant of the index of trade similarity  and of the index of intensity of
multilateral  trde  transactions, developed  long ago in my studies  (1962a) and (1962b), respectively) and adopted
since for a variety of purposes (such as the measurement  of intra-industry  trade).  For an analysis of the
properties of the index, comparing  it with others and concluding  that it is indeed the preferred tool for the
measurement  of similarity of trade pattems, see Jacob Kol and Loet B.M. Mennes (1986) and Jacob Kol (1988).-23  -
The range of values of this index of compatibility  (say, between j's  imports and k's
exports) is between zero and unity.  It will be zero when the trade flows have no similarity
whatsoever: there is no good imported at all, by one country, which is exported to any
extent by the other.  The index will reach unity, on the other hand, its maximum  level,
when the structures of the two trade flows are identical: in proportion of each aggregate,
one country exports precisely what the other imports.
In a similar way, we define the index of compatibility  between the home-country's
production  and the partner-country's exports. It is:
E  1x.  - qk  l
Cx 1q,,  =  1-  2
where
Cxjq^  =  index of compatibility  of exports of country j with production of country
k
x*;  =  (as before) share of good i in total exports of country  j; and
qik  =  share of good i in total production of tradables  of country k.
Once more, the index ranges potentially  from zero to unity.  It will be zero when
one country exports none of what the other country is producing; and unity when the
structure of one country's exports is identical with that of the other's production.
The third index, finally, describes  the compatibility  of the structures of the two
export flows - one of the home country and the other of its partner.  It is defimed  as:- 24 -
EIxy  - xik
TXjXk  l-2
where
TxIxk  =  index of compatibility  of exports of country  j with exports of country k
xij  =  (as before) share of good i in total exports of country j; and
Xk  =  (as before) share of good i in total exports of country k.
As is self evident by now, the index ranges from zero - where no good is exported
jointly by the two countries - to unity, when the structures  of exports in the two countries
are identical.
The first index (S), relating one country's imports  to the other's exports, is an
indication of potential for trade  diversion.  The nature of that diversion  is a replacement  of
iInports  from other ("third") countries by imports from the (potential)  partner to the
preferential agreement.  If the structure of exports of "third" countries to the home country
(which is the structure of the latter's imports 11) is very similar to the export structure of the
partner country, the potential  for displacement  of the former's exports by the latter - which
is precisely the diversion of the home country's source of imports - will be large.  If, at the
11.  Strictly speaking, the two are not identical: wthird'  countries' exports to the home country are equal to
the latter's total imports niinus its imports from the partner country.  But in practice, the difference between the
composition  of the two aggregates  will not normally  be substantial.- 25 -
other extreme, the partner country exports nothing similar to what the "third" countries
export to the home country, no trade diversion at all would be possible.
The index of trade (export-import)  compatibility  thus provides an
indication-qualitative in nature-of  the scope of trade expansion  following  a preferential
agreement. This may be referred to as an indication of "relevance"  of such an agreement.
But it should be noted that as far as this information  is concerned, large scope, or strong
"relevance", do not necessarily  mean large benefits:  trade diversion  has a negative
production effect, and a positive consumption  effect, so that its net welfare effect is
ambiguous. In other words:  from the fact that a large expansion  of trade between two
partners may be expected from the agreement  due to trade diversion would not follow
necessarily a judgement that such an agreement should be pursued.
In a similar way, though this may be less immediately  obvious, the index of
compatibility  (C) between the structure of the home-country's production and  of the
partner-country's exports indicates the potential for trade  creation.  The essence of the
latter is a displacement  of the country's own production by the partner's exports.  The more
similar the structure of the two flows, the more likely is the replacement  of one (own
production) by the other (imports from the partner); that is, the higher the potential for trade
creation.  When the partner country exports nothing of what the home country produces, no
substitution  of imports (from the partner) for own production is possible; and, thus, the
potential for trade creation would be nil. 12
12.  It is worth emphasizing  again that we refer here to partial indicators. The size of the partner country
would obviously be one of the other criteria for judging the potential  of trade expansion  with that partner,
whether it is trade diversion  of or trade creation.- 26 -
So far as this indication is concerned, strong "relevance"  of an agreement would also
imply a large benefit from it, since trade creation is unambiguously  welfare enhancing.  A
comparison  of the two indices of compatibility  (of the partner country's exports with the
home country's imports and with its production)  may thus also yield an inference-again,
strictly in a qualitative  way-of  whether a potential  agreement is not only "relevant" but is
also more or less likely to be beneficial.
The third index (T), of compability  of exports structures, does not have a life of
itself: it is designed  to be used in conjunction  with the index of production-exports
compatibility,  to lower the risk of a misguided  interpretation of the latter.  Suppose that two
countries specialize  in the same goods (and would do so without import barriers); for
instance, both specialize in oil.  That good would then form a high proportion, in both
countries, of both production and exports.  The production-exports  index of compatibility
would then tend to be high; but in this case, an inference of a high potential of replacement
of local productiun by imports from the partner country would manifestly  be unwarranted.
An attribute of such case, however, is that the export structures of the two countries are
similar (in the example, oil would form a high proportion of both countries export flows).
That is, a high level of compatibility  of export structures should indicate a low potential of
trade creation; and this index should  be used to check the indications  provided by the
production-exports  index of compatibility.
The levels of the three indices, and inferences  drawn from the data will be discussed
at some length in the following  two sections. Here, a few problems faced in construction of
the indices will be noted.- 27 -
Constructing the first index (S) and the third index (T) - indices of compatibility of
trade flows - is a relatively straightforward procedure.  Data of trade flows, classifled by a
uniform scheme-the  SITC (Standard International  Trade Classification)-are almost
universally available. A minor problem encountered  when comparisons  with earlier periods
are concerned (such as the 1960's) is that the precise classification  scheme has slightly
changed over the years; but in the present context these changes  are of very little
significance-the  use of one scheme and not the other would be almost immaterial for the
size of the index.  A more general problem is the selection of degree of detail of the
classification  scheme. Obviously, adopting the "two-digit"  level (which distinguishes  among
69 items) would group together goods which are widely different from each other." 3 We
have experimented  with the next two levels of classification  -the "three-digit"  (with 239
items) and the "four-digit"  (with 790 items).  Although  the indices constructed  under the two
alternatives are naturally different from each other, it was found that in general the
differences were minor; and, moreover, that they are immaterial for the relative levels of the
indices in comparisons  of the countries.  We have therefore selected  just one scheme-the
"three-digit" level; and all the indices presented are based on data thus classified.
Construction  of the other index (C), of compatibility  between trade and production, is
a much bigger challenge.  To start with, the index is to match a flow of trade with a flow of
production of tradables  (which are the component  of the national  product subject to
replacement  by imports). A determination  of what is or is not "tradable"  is subject to to a
large degree of arbitrariness, due to both conceptual  problems (e.g. a "non-tradable"  activity
13.  For example, coffee, tea, cocoa, chocolate, and spices would be classified  as one good.- 28 -
at one price range would become "tradable"  at another); and practical problems of data
availability. In fact, we have equated here, as is often done for lack of a better practical
alternative, the production of "tradables"  with that of goods; whereas  services constitute  the
"non-tradables". Once in a while, this pragmatic solution  may distort the outcome.' 4
Next, data of structure of production is classified differently  than trade (using the
SIC-Standard  Industrial Classification-  rather than the SITC).  Moreover, unlike the
richness of trade data-which  allows, inter alia, a selection  of the degree of fineness of
classification-production data are available at best at one classification  level, which is
generally less detailed than the three-digit SITC level.  Indeed, sometimes  data which are
generally available do not go beyond the one-digit level: minerals  are the most important
case in point.  At this level, comparisons  of structures of production  and trade flows would
yield inferences  of very little value.  We have therefore constructed  ourselves a more finely
classified data when this was required, ending up with a classification  into 75 items-a  less
satisfactory scheme than that applied for trade data.
G.  Trade  Compatibility: Potential for Trade Diversion
The index of compatibility  of trade flows of the country and its partner is, we have
argued, an indicator of the potential  for trade diversion; as such, it also is an indicator of the
14.  An obvious case in point is that of Panama, in which most "tradables"  would  actually be found in the
services sectors.- 29 -
relevance of a contemplated  preferential agreement. This index for 1990 is presented in
Table 7, in a matrix form.  15
The countries listed in the vertical column are exporters, and they are the potential
partners to each importing country listed horizontally. A high coefficient would mean that a
preferential agreement between an "importing"  country and an "exporting"  one would have a
high likelihood of diverting imports of the former from the "rest of the world" to the
"exporting"  country.  For instance, the column for Argentina will show the compatibility  of
its imports with the exports of, in turn, Bolivia,  Brazil, Chile and so on.  Thus, the column
would show the potential for diversion of Argentina's imports from the rest of the world to,
in turn, Bolivia, Brazil,Chile, etc.
It is immediately  evident that almost all the indices are rather low.  The exceptions
occur mainly where the exporting country is either Brazil or Mexico or, to a lesser extent,
Argentina.  Thus, for all the Latin American  countries as importers, a preferential agreement
with almost any other Latin American country is not likely to lead to much trade diversion.
The averages  for the importing countries are shown as a separate row (they are. 16 for
Argentina, .15 for Bolivia, and so on).  As can be seen, these averages are remarkably similar
for the different countries-and  are all low:  they range from a high of .23 for Panama to a
low of .15 for Bolivia and Paraguay.  Interestingly  enough, the average index of compatibility
is within this range (it is .21) also for the U.S.; that is, as an importing country, the U.S.
would realize little trade diversion in potential  preferential agreements with
15.  1990 has been selected because it is the latest year for which data are available  for all countries. We
have constructed the indices also for 1988 and 1989, as well as for the averages of 1988-1990,  and found only
minor differences in comparing them with the indices for 1990.Table 7:  Indices of Trade Compatibility in Latin America, 1990
Imports
ARG  BOL  BRA  CHL  COL  CRI  ECU  GTM  HND  JAM  MEX  NIC  PAN  PER  PRY  SLV  URY  VEN  AVG  USA  CAN  NAFT  ME
ARG  0.24  0.28  028  029  0.37  0.36  0.33  0.37  0.36  0.34  0.37  0.31  0.32  0.41  0.26  0.41  0.32  0.36  0.34  0.28  0.28  0.29  0.29
BOL  0.13  0.03  0.09  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.10  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.03  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.10
BRA  0.38  0.33  0.31  0.38  0.40  0.37  0.43  0.36  0.36  0.37  0.43  0.31  0.39  0.37  0.30  0.39  0.34  0.43  0.37  0.42  0.42  0.43  0.35
18  ~~ ~ ~  15  0.1!- ~~~ 41137  ~~  ~  J~~O  L  OTh;0Q92.~~~J4,VQ2p-  0.18s  0.14  0.16  0.1  047,  0.17.
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Exports  ECU  0.06  0.03  0.26  0.17  0.09  0.12  0.05  0.15  0.17  0.11  0.07  0.22  0.20  0.14  0.14  0.15  0.22  0.05  0.14  0.18  0.11  0.17  0.23
GTM  0.19  0.21  0.19  0.20  0.16  0.24  0.19  0.23  0.28  0.23  0.22  0.25  0.30  0.20  0.19  0.31  0.22  0.16  0.22  0.21  0.22  0.21  0.20
HND  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.09  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.11  0.12  0.09  0.10  0.08  0.05  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.08
"Aw,00  0$7w&  -0.1  0.104  %11  0.0  0.14 i,~0.13  0.14  0.11
aM~r-~-  ~fJ~35  424  q532~C4~  O3S-~03t~,  ~03~  ~3￿  A52  :  0.1  0.34  0.38~  0.50  0.38'  040~  ~50  0.48  0.51  0.52OM
~~~1C  ~  ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~O1370~~~~~~~~~~L~~~~4(  O1O~~~~~~~~~~  0.10  0.10  0.10
PAN  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.14  0.13  0.16  0.13  0.17  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.16  0.21  0.17  0.13  0.20  0.17  0.15  0.16  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.17
PER  0.15  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.17  0.18  0.12  0.20  0.20  0.21  0.16  0.12  0.15  0.16  0.15  0.23  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.14  0.17  0.14
PRY  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.02  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.06
~~  O~~80~2~~.  ~~  0.24  ~~~  0.18  019  0.21  ~~~0.21;01 0.21  0.22  0.21  0.22  0.18
020  .0.2020  021  0.19
USA  0.53  0.48  0.52  0.54  0.56  0.52  0.50  0.48  0.44  0.50  0.63  0.40  0.43  0.48  0.39  0.46  0.46  0.58  0.49  0.60  0.68  0.64  0.55
CAN  0.41  0.45  0.43  0.43  0.42  0.48  0.41  0.45  0.44  0.41  0.44  0.41  0.42  0.40  0.35  0.42  0.39  0.44  0.42  0.59  0.59  0.60  0.46
Sour=e  Estimated from data in Comtrade, UN.  Statistical Office- 31 -
Latin American countries.  Once more Brazil and Mexico (for the latter this is, of course,
more than a "potential")  are the exceptions. This is a remarkable contrast to the position of
the U.S. as an exporter in such agreements,  which will be noted shortly.
As exporters, the indices of compatibility  of any given Latin American country with
imports of the others naturally vary somewhat. But, for each individual  exporting country,
the variance is small enough to make the average index a meaningful  representation  of its
position.  These averages are shown in the column following that of Venezuela (they are .34
for Argentina, .07 for Bolivia, and so on).  In Table 8, we rank the countries  by this
average, and show the latter along with four other variables: the degree of commodity
concentration  of exports, measured by the Gini-Hirschman  coefficient; the level of per capita
income; the size of aggregate income; and the share of manufacturing  in the total production
of goods.
These variables are clearly interrelated  to each other; they all represent factors we
have discussed  earlier as likely to lead to a high relevance of a preferential agreement.  A
formal analysis of the relationships  of the index of compatibility  to these variables is
provided in Annex 3.  But even without it, a cursory look at the findings suggests  a clear-cut
pattern, in the expected directions. The index of compatibility  tends to be higher when the
country is large (in terms of aggregate  GDP); rich (in terms of high per-capita income);
having a production pattern in which manufacturing  is predominant; and having diversified
exports.  At the top of the list stand, as a group apart, Mexico, Brazil and, to a lesser extent,
Argentina: Latin America's largest countries  which are also among the richest, with highly
diversified exports (less exceptionally  for Mexico) and with the highest shares of industrial
production.  The indices of all other economies  are substantially  lower.  At the bottom are-32-
Table 8:  Average Indices of Trade Compatibility and Explanatory Variables
Coefficient  Percentage of
Average  of Export  Per Capita  Aggregate  Manufacturing in
Country  Index  Concentration  Income ($)  Income ($b.)  Production of Goods
1.  Mexico  .41  .36  3,470  295  70.8
2.  Brazil  .38  .16  2,719  425  72.0
3.  Argentina  .32  .20  6,050  200  71.3
4.  Colombia  .25  .34  1,290  45  48.0
5.  Costa Rica  .22  .33  2,000  6  54.2
6.  Guatemala  .22  .32  980  10  37.1
7.  El Salvador  .22  .45  1,170  6  55.5
8.  Uruguay  .20  .27  3,340  10  67.6
9.  Panama  .17  .34  2,440  6  37.9
10.  Venezuela  .17  .80  2,900  59  50.2
11.  Peru  .16  .32  950  21  73.9
12.  Chile  .14  .44  2,730  37  43.0
13.  Ecuador  .14  .52  630  12  46.9
14.  Jamaica  .11  .66  1,340  3  54.9
15.  Nicaragua  .10  .37  410  1  37.6
16.  Honduras  .09  .46  580  3  40.0
17.  Bolivia  .07  .36  680  5  26.5
18.  Paraguay  .07  .47  1,340  6  35.8
U.S.A.  .52  .14  23,120  5,904
Source:  Author's estimates  and World Bank data- 33 -
Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia, and Paraguay-among the poorest economies (except for
Paraguay), the smallest (in economic  size), the least industrialized,  and with a relatively
concentrated structure of exports.  The outlier, in its position, seems to be Uruguay: despite
its small economic  size, the other variables would lead us to expect a higher compatibility of
its exports with other trade flows than its index actually shows.
By this measure, then, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina would appear to be the likeliest
candidates as partners for a relevant preferential agreement (but not necessarily  a beneficial
one-the  promise here is for trade diversion!). Interestingly  enough, a shift from Brazil to
the whole of MERCOSUR  does not change materially  the index of compatibility of the area's
exports: the predominance  of Brazil, and the varied structure of its exports, make the
addition of other countries (in essence, of Argentina) of only small significance in increasing
the diversity of exports.  This is true not just for the average index (it is .38 for
MERCOSUR  vs. .37 for just Brazil) but also for the indices which relate the area's (Brazil,
or MERCOSUR)  export flows with the imports flows of each individual  country.  By this
yardstick, thus, Brazil is about as relevant as the whole of MERCOSUR  as a potential
partner for a preferential agreement. The Andean  Group, in distinction  from MERCOSUR,
appears by the present yardstick to be of very small relevance: the compatibility indices of
the trade of its members are mostly  very low, in relationship  to the trade of other members
as well as to trade with other Latin American countries.  This is almost as  true for the
CACM countries, whose indices are only slightly higher-again,  with almost no difference
between intra-group and other trade flows.
How does Latin America as a whole look on this score? For a meaningful answer,
the continent must be compared with other parts of the world.  To start with, and of-34 -
immediate  significance  for the purpose on hand, Table 7 shows also the indices of trade
compatibility for the U.S.  These are substantially  higher than any of the indices of Latin
American countries, either in their average level (.48 vs. .40 and .37 for, respectively,
Mexico and Brazil), or in relationship  to any individual  Latin American country (the U.S.
indices range from a low of .39 for trade with Paraguay to a high of .63 for trade with
Mexico).  This, of course, is not surprising in view of the U.S. aggregate income and per
capita income levels, and the high degree of dispersion  of its export structure.  Similarly to
the comparison  of Brazil alone with MERCOSUR,  the index for NAFTA is not much
different from that of the U.S. by itself-again,  not surprising in view of the dominant size
of the U.S. and its varied export structure. By this yardstick, thus-as  by judgements made
on the basis of earlier observations-the U.S., whether alone or through NAFTA, would be
significantly  a more relevant parter  for a trade preferential agreement, to any Latin
American country, than any other Latin American  country by itself (including  Brazil and
Mexico) or any combination  of countries  within Latin America.
As a comparator for Latin America, it should be useful to present European countries;
specifically, members of the most successful-at least, most effective-contemporary
customs-union  organization, the European Economic  Union (until recently, the Economic
Community). This is done in Table 9, where the indices of present members of the E.U.  as
well as the three Scandinavian  countries  likely to join it soon-Finland,  Norway and
Sweden-are presented.  The U.S. is again added to the list.
It is immediately  apparent that the compatibility  indices are uniformly higher-mostly
substantially  so-than  they are for Latin American  economies.  In fact, the lowest (by far)
indices  in Europe-those of Greece and Norway-are  about as high as those of Argentina,Table  9:  Indices  of  Trade  Compatibility  In Europe,  1990
Imports
BLX  DNK  ESP  FIN  FRA  GER  GRC  ITA  NLD  NOR  PRT  SWE  U.K.  USA  AVG  Xcc
BLX  0.72  0.61  0.56  0.58  0.63  0.62  0.61  0.63  0.59  0.53  0.57  0.57  0.60  0.55  0.59  0.17
DNK  0.55  0.61  0.53  0.56  0.54  0.53  0.56  0.51  0.55  0.55  0.48  0.56  0.53  0.45  0.53  0.13
ESP  0.61  0.62  0.62  0.62  0.65  0.64  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.57  0.61  0.63  0.63  0.61  0.61  0.17
FIN  0.48  0.53  0.49  0.49  0.48  0.47  0.49  0.46  0.49  0.48  0.46  0.50  0.48  0.44  0.48  0.28
Exports  FRA  0.69  0.67  0.71  0.69  0.74  0.72  0.68  0.69  0.69  0.64  0.69  0.70  0.72  0.62  0.68  0.12
GER  0.67  0.68  0.71  0.72  0.73  0.69  0.65  0.67  0.67  0.64  0.68  0.74  0.69  0.62  0.68  0.14
Li'
GRC  0.40  0.36  0.30  0.34  0.35  0.40  0.35  0.36  0.35  0.34  0.33  0.35  0.34  0.33  0.35  0.18
ITA  0.61  0.64  0.60  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.61  0.56  0.63  0.62  0.63  0.69  0.63  0.58  0.63  0.12
NLD  0.65  0.66  0.59  0.60  0.66  0.65  0.59  0.63  0.67  0.58  0.55  0.61  0.62  0.54  0.61  0.13
NOR  0.36  0.39  0.40  0.38  0.39  0.37  0.37  0.38  0.38  0.36  0.37  0.37  0.36  0.38  0.38  0.38
PRT  OA5  0.46  OA3  0.46  0.47  OA  0.44  0.43  OA6  0.45  OA3  0.46  0.46  OA6  0.45  0.16
SWE  0.58  0.61  0.65  0.67  0.63  0.61  0.57  0.59  0.60  0.57  0.61  0.66  0.61  0.59  0.61  0.16
U.K.  0.65  0.68  0.72  0.71  0.73  0.70  0.66  0.69  0.71  0.65  0.66  0.74  0.76  0.66  0.69  0.12
USA  0.61  0.61  0.68  0.63  0.64  0.64  0.54  0.63  0.65  0.59  0.61  0.64  0.68  0.60  0.63  0.14
Source: Estimated from data in Comtrade, U.N. Statistical Office- 36 -
Brazil and Mexico, the three countries  whose indices far exceeded  all the rest among Latin
American countries.  Not surprisingly, in Europe too the determinants  of the level of trade
compatibility seem to be the level of development  and the degree of dispersion  of exports: of
the four countries with distinctly  lower indices  than the rest, two-Greece  and
Portugal-have  substantially  lower per capita income than the rest of Europe; whereas the
other two-Finland  and Norway-have  a substantially  less diversified  structure of exports.
Compatibility  of U.S. exports with imports of the European  countries is on the same level as
that found among the European countries themselves;  and it is somewhat  higher than U.S.
compatibility with imports of Latin American  countries-equal  to the highest of these, i.e.,
the level recorded in the U.S. trade with Mexico.
It may be argued that a particularly high degree of compatibility  among European
trade flows in fact reflects the effect of the long existence  of trade preferences  practiced in
this bloc (although, given the levels of development  and of export diversification,
compatibility  of trade of the three countries that are only about to join the Union appears to
be simnilar  to that of the trade flows of long-existing  partners).  For that reason, it may be
interesting also to make a comparison  with European Union trade flows when the integration
process just started.  Table 10 presents, thus, the indices of compatibility  in trade among the
six original members of the Community  (Belgium  and Luxembourg  combined, France,
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands)  in 1962, an early year of the Community's existence.
It may be seen that indices of compatibility  had, indeed, been lower in this group in
the early 1960's than they became by the early 1990's. To what extent this may be explained
by preferential agreements  rather than by factors such as much higher income levels or-37-
Table 10:  Indices of Trade  Compatibility in Europe,  1962
Imports
BLX  FRA  GER  ITA  NLD  AVG  Xcc
BLX  0.58  0.46  0.50  0.46  0.55  0.49  0.16
FRA  0.64  0.56  0.57  0.54  0.66  0.60  0.14
Exports  GER  0.56  0.50  0.40  0.49  0.58  0.54  0.19
ITA  0.55  0.48  0.49  0.41  0.56  0.52  0.18
NLD  0.52  0.47  0.53  0.46  0.58  0.50  0.15
Source:  Estimated  from data in Comtrade,  U.N.  Statistical OfficeTable  11:  Indices of Trade  Compatibility  in Asia-Pacific Group,  1990
Imports
AUS  CAN  CHL  CHN  HKG  IDN  JPN  KOR  MEX  MYS  NZL  OAN  PHL  PNG  SGP  THA  USA  AVG  Xcc
Australia  AUS  0.3  0.28  0.25  0.26  0.24  0.27  0.39  0.32  0.24  0.30  0.26  0.34  0.43  0.25  0.25  0.29  0.28  0.29  0.27
Canada  CAN  0.5  0.59  0.43  0.40  0.33  0.43  0.51  0.45  0.44  0.42  0.50  048  0.47  0.39  0.40  0.48  0.59  0.45  0.18
Chile  CHL  0.2  017  0.12  0.13  0.15  0.14  0.26  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.19  0.16  0 14  0.13  0.17  0.16  0.16  0.44
CHN 04  0.46  041  ',  .
H  o gKorea  K  O |  0.4  0  .4  03 9  0.3  0.62~ 0  .35  0  .3  6  04 0  0. 9  0 4.4  0.4  0. 5  0 3  . 0  0 39  0 5.  30  1
03.2  7;  028  00
Philiines  PHL  0.6  0.627  0550  0472  0.435  0.50  0.30  0.247  0.55  0.56  0.55  0.54  0.41  0.43  0.59  0.56  0.58  0.53  0.20
KoreaNs  KNR  0.4  0.42  0.39  0381  0062  0.35  0.36  0.40  0.39  0.147  0.46  0.45  0.35  0.35  0.50  0.39  0.50  0.43  0.16
Meingaor  MEP  0.4  0.48  0.45  0.28  0290  0.40  0.47  0.42  0356  0340  0.46  0420  0434  0.31  0.44  0.37  0.42  0.40  0.36
;  *  *si04:  g~-  * 
Sou  ce  E  i  t  fmf
OAN .0.25  0.44  0.29.>08  06  .4  0  3  .>~~u  1
Exhots  ljpine  JPN-  0.3  0.627  0.20  0.22  0.435  0.18  0.31  0.247  0.23  0246  0.24  0.29  0.37  0.21  0.26  0.23  0.34  0.26  0330
Kapea Ne  ORN  0.4  0.11  0.09  0.11  0082  009  0.15  0.40  0.08  0.147  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.516
Seingaoe  SGP  0.5  0.45  0.45  0.36  0.50  0.35  0.38  0.45  0.46  0.50  0.46  0.50  0.434  0.40  0.65  0.46  0.49  0.44  0.25
mauani  ~1  TIIA0.4  0 $4  0.8  02ev2Q  X~t9~~:9  4 
USA 4  SNL  '037 0.68.  0224 049420p~s  a  ~  r0:  a~~
Source: Estimated from data in Comtrade, U.N. Statistical Office- 39 -
American countries (Chile and Mexico). The indices of compatibility  of trade within this
group are presented in Table 11.
As may be seen from a comparison  of Tables 11 and 7, trade compatibility  in this
group is much higher than within Latin America, although the differences  are not as stark as
in the comparison with European countries.  As was the case in relationship  to Latin
American countries-by  now, this should  certainly not be a surprise-compatibility is highest
in trade relationships  with the U.S.; in this sense, the U.S. position within the Asian-Pacific
group is very sirnilar to its position versus the Latin American economies. As in the other
groups of economies, compatibility  appears to be determined  by economic size, level of
development, and export diversification. Next to the U.S. comes Japan-a  country of a
roughly similar economic size and level of development  as the U.S., but with a somewhat
less diversified structure of exports.  Interestingly, Japan's trade is not more but somewhat
less compatible than that of the U.S. in relationship  even with practically all of its Asian
neighbors (Singapore is a slight exception);  this supports the hypothesis  that the
aforementioned  factors (size, richness, diversity of exports, and the share of manufacturing)
rather than geographical  proximity are the important  determinants  of compatibility  of trade
flows among countries.  In the same vein, it may be seen that Mexico's indices of
compatibility are roughly the same in the present group as in trade with its neighbors in Latin
America; or,  similarly, that Chile's exports-due  to their very high level of
concentration-are  as incompatible  in relationship  to Asian countries as in trade with Chile's
neighbors in Latin America.  In sum, overlooking  the U.S. and Canada as potential  partners,
it appears that a preferential group of Asian-Pacific  countries, while not promising to be asTable 12:  Indices of Trade-Production Compatibility in Latin America
Production
ARG  BOL  BRA  CHL  COL  CRI  ECU  GTM  HND  JAM  MEX  NIC  PAN  PER  PRY  SLV  IJRY  VEN  AVG
ARG  0o50  0,34  0.49  0 35  0.36  0.39  037  0.46  0 34  0.32  0.43  n.a.  0.32  na.  n.a.  na.  0.41  0.37  0.38
BOL  0.13  0.31  0.15  0.27  0.13  014  015  015  016  0.14  0.15  n.a  012  n.a.  r.a  a  a  011  0 12  0 15
BRA  048  028  057  036  0.41  045  041  0.46  0.33  0.31  042  na  029  na.  na.  0 41  037  038
Exports  c,um  031  028  0.32  0.49  0.27  0.28  0_28  0.28-  0 26'  030  nLa.  0.25  n.a.  n.a  a  n.a  O029  2  -7  028
COL  0.39  028  0.30  0.20  0.40  0.42  0.43  0.38'031  0.26 '0.40  n.a.  024  n.e.  na.  na  . 0.27  0036  0.33
CRI  0.33  0.26  0.35  0  D.24  0.38  0  .57  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.310.  n.a.  0.51  r.a.  n.a  n.a.  0.35  0.29  0.37
ECtJ  028  i)31  01 9  0 16  029  031  046  023  035  023  038  na  '!30  na  na  na  0 18  044  028
GTM  032  j24  0 32  0.21  0.35  0.49  tJ39  054  0.39  026  0.28  na.  031  r.a  na.  na  Q)31  0.25  0932
IIND  0 160  021  Uj  17  0  17  0 20  041  0.29  0.34  041  0 20  0 14  n d  40  na  n a  n a.  0 17  0 14  023
JAM  0.34  028  0.34  024  032  038  0.35  0.38  0.32  0.37  0.32  n.a.  0.35  n.a.  n.a.  n.ae.  0.34  0.29  0.33
MEX  0.48  0.31  0.44  0.30  0.40  0.24  0.46 -0.26  0.19  0.27  0.59  -na.  0.18  -na.  n.a.  n.a.  0.30  0.62  0.34
NIC  0.21  0.21  0.17  0.11  0.26  0.41  0.26  035  0.33  0.20 - 0.17  n.a.  0.27  n.a.  n.a.  na.e  0.20  0.12  0.25
PAN  0.40  040  041  0 36  0 44  056  0.49  051  0W5  0.40  l  na  '.62  na  na  n d  43  i, 44
PER  0.37  0.36  0 35  0.38  0  3  u,  39  0,36  0 41  0u30  0 30  0.35  n a  0 28  n a  n a  nn  0'  ()  7  (
PRY  0.25  0.22  021  0 17  0 18  024  0 22  028  022  0.21  0.19  na  0.23  na  na  na  .. 2  015  05
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effective as a grouping of European economies, would still be more relevant than any
contemplated  grouping within Latin America.  This is undoubtedly  due to Latin American
economies being (with the important exceptions  of Brazil and Mexico) much smaller, poorer,
and less diversified economically  than those in the Asian-pacific  group." 7
H.  Trade-Production  Compatibility:  Potential for Trade Creation
The indices of compatibility  of a country's own production with exports of another
are shown in Table 12.  The row represents the producing ("home") country; and the column
the exporting ("potential partner") country.  The higher the index in any box the stronger is
the potential for trade creation in an agreement  of the "importing"  with the "exporting"
country-replacing  home production in the former by imports from the latter.
Probably the most striking feature of the findings of Table 12, particularly when
compared with with indices of Table 7, is the low variance among countries.  For each
("exporting") country, the indices with the other individual  Latin American countries do
differ from each other; but the average levels of the indices are mostly rather similar.  By
and large, we may thus infer that the potential for trade creation, as it is indicated  by the
yardstick on hand, does not provide a strong ground for distinguishing  one or another
country as a clearly preferred partner for a trade agreement. In particular, Brazil, Mexico
and Argentina, which appear on other scores to be the most relevant potential partners for
17.  Intra-industry  trade follows  the patterns of trade compatibility:  it is, overall, higher in the Asian-Pacific
group than in Latin America, but substantially  lower than the norm in Europe.  Aside from the U.S. and
Canada, the index of intra-industry  trade reaches European levels only in Singapore-an economy with an
exceptionally  high proportion of essentially transit trade.  The real surprise, in this sense, is the very low level
of intra-industry  trade in Japan; only slightly less surprising  is the low level of such trade in Australia.  In both
economies,  protection of importables  is high.  This, presumably,  leads to the absence  or low levels of many
imports  whose existence would otherwise  have meant a higher level of intra-industry  trade.Table 12:  Indices of Trade-Production  Compatibility in Latin America
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agreements within Latin America, do not possess any uniqueness in the case on hand.  Their
indices of compatibility (as the partner) are somewhat  higher than those of most others; but
they do not form any exception.
The indices of compatibility  appear to be relatively high for relationships  among
Central American countries (the four that are represented  in the table are Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama).  The average of the indices for this group is .41, vs.
.28 for the rest of the relationships  within Latin America. On this score, thus, Central
American economies  do present themselves  as more promising  than others as candidates for
trade preferential agreements. But it should be recalled that by all other yardsticks,
agreements within this group would be judged to have only little promise.
Of more interest would have been comparisons  of relationships  within Latin America
to those which involve the U.S.; and, for the sake of acquiring  perspective, to relationships
in other groups of countries in Europe and Asia.  The difficulties  involved in establishing  the
data of structures of production have prevented such comparisons  at this juncture; but they
should be pursued in any further extension of the study of this topic.
I.  Condusions
We have used in this study several criteria to asses ex-ante the chances for meaningful
and successful  trade preferential agreements  among Latin American countries and between
them and North-America, particularly the U.S..
The inferences from practically all of these yardsticks  are almost uniform: the
evidence strongly suggests that the likelihood  of agreements within Latin america being
indeed successful is rather low.  To start with, the intense liberalization  of recent years has- 44 -
paradoxically  lowered the likelihood  of a beneficial agreement: with a low starting level of
tariffs (and non-tariff barriers) on trade flows among Latin-American  countries, a preferential
agreement is more likely to have an adverse rather than a beneficial impact (though this
impact would be small in any case).  Other criteria point in the same direction: small shares
of Latin American's countries in world trade, and in trade with each other; small shares of
these countries in world income; a low level of economic  development  of most of these
economies  and, associated  with it, absence  of economic  diversification  in the majority of
countries.
Some of these factors are represented in the levels of two composite  indices that were
devised for the purpose on hand.  One describes  the similarity  between the structures of a
country's imports and a partner's exports; and it indicates  the potential for trade diversion.
The other index, from which the potential  for trade creation may be inferred, describes the
similarity between the pattern of the country's own production and that of its partner's
exports.  These indices are generally  higher the higher the partner country's level of
economic  development,  its economic  size, and the degree of diversity of its exports.  The
indices give the same indication  as those of the other criteria: that is, generally, a small
likelihood  of successful  preferential agreements  within Latin America.  As a rule, such
agreements would be far less meaningful  than they are in today's Europe, or even of what
could be predicted  when the European Economic  Community  was formed.  Perhaps less
expected is the indication  that such agreements  within latin America are also, by and large,
less promising than potential agreements  among countries in the Asian-Pacific
region-another part of the world in which a discussion  of intra-regional  preferences has
become recently popular.- 45 -
On the other hand, the U.S. is, by the above criteria, a promising partner for
preferential agreements with the large majority of Latin-America's  counties.  It is interesting
to note that conclusion of agreements between blocs of countries with the U.S. is not more
meaningful than U.S. agreements  with individual  countries.  Thus, to cite an important
example, a U.S. agreement with just Brazil would have the same promise as an agreement
with the whole of MERCOSUR. Going beyond the scope of the study, it should be pointed
that the target of "locking in" the (hitherto multilateral)  process of trade liberalization
through a commitment  undertaken in a bilateral or multilateral agreement would also be
served much better in an agreement with the U.S. than in any intra-regional agreement in
Latin America.
Given that any intra-Latin  American agreement must be of little significance, those
that would still be of some relevance  are only agreements  that would involve Brazil, Mexico
or, to a lesser extent, Argentina. Since Mexico is a NAFTA member, involvement  of
Mexico would most probably mean an agreement with (perhaps  accession to)
NAFTA-where  the major impact would be due to the involvement  of the U.S.  This leaves
practically only Brazil as a Latin American partner to at least a marginally significant
preferential agreement. Within the present context of existing regional agreement, this would
mean an accession  to MERCOSUR-a relationship  with which would be only slightly more
meaningful than an agreement which involves  just Brazil.  Judging by indicators of this
study, Bolivia is the distinct case in which a preferential agreement with Brazil, or an
accession  to MERCOSUR,  might be fruitful.-46-
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ANNEX 1
Partner-Specific  Tariff Levels
For purposes such as the one discussed  in the text, we would wish to know not just what the
level of tariffs of a country is in general, but what it is in relation to some specific trade
partners.  An index, which might be constructed  for the purpose on hand, is the following:
T  =Et'  m ,
jk  J  Jk
where
Tik  =  Average level of tariffs imposed by country j  on imports from country k;
til  =  Rate of tariff imposed in country j on imports of good i; and
m,k  =  Share of good i in country j's  aggregate  imports from country k.
Such an index would suffer from well-known  deficiencies  of measurements  of
average tariff levels:  it does not incorporate (as a true index should) the elasticities of supply
and demand; and it is biased downward,  since it assigns small weights to imports with high
tariff rates which tend, due to this high barrier, to be low.  Nevertheless, the index would
have given some rough impressions about tariff levels in Latin America's intra-regional  trade
(as well as, if needed, any other trade flows among countries). Of the two components  of
the index, data are available about the  m,  's -the  commodity  trade composition of trade
flows among countries. Data of the t,'  's -tariff  levels by goods-are  not yet available for a
system of i's classified in a manner (such as the SITC) which would make them useful.  But
they may become available soon.-50-
ANNEX 2
Changes in Geographical Trade Shares
In general, changes in shares of trade of a home country with a partner may be
decomposed  in two parts:  One, a "neutral" or "objective" component, is due simply to the
changing  over time of the partner's relative size in world trade.  The other component, a
residual, reflects the "net" change that could be assigned  to changes in specific factors which
may affect the size of trade between the two countries: the establishment  of (positive  or
negative)  discrimination  in the trade policies of the two (such as the conclusion  of a
preferential tariff agreement); specific  changes in transportation  costs; and similar factors.
Let
j  =  home country;  k  =  partner country;  0  =  starting period;  1 =  ending period
(1)  SZ  = (actual) share  of j  s exports  in k  s imports
(2)  S*  = (actual) share  of k's  imports in world  imports
(3)  S,,  =  "expected'  share  of j's  exports  in k's  imports at  end  of period  1.
(4)  C,  = "neutral" coefficient  of  the share of j's  exports  in  k's  imports
(5)  CZ  = "adjusted"  coefficient  of  the share of j's  exports  in  k's  imports
where:
hSW
(6)C  h  -A
C~Sk-51-
(7)  CZJ=SJ  /  Sk
c  oCh  oSkwJ
(8)  Skj = Se  C  = Ski S°
hence:
(^9)  Ct;=Z  J  SkwJ
This could be refned (in practice, at a high cost) to address the total change in the share of
k's  imports in j's  exports as the aggregate  of changes in the shares of individual goods.
Thus, for each good i:
(10)  Ca[J  = S  SA _
(II)  Ca  =  S  (C,al)  =  CS  (a  -$  k-w)
The corrected changes  in the share of k's exports in j's  imports will be defined in a parallel
way, mutatis mutandis.
Table A-1 presents the adjusted  trade coefficients  for several Latin American
countries between 1984 and 1994.  It shows the rate of growth of exports of the country or-52-
region listed in the column to the region listed in the row.  Where the coefficient is larger
than one, these exports have increased faster than the growth of total imports of the
respective region.
Table A-1
The Adjusted Change in the Share of Partners  in Home Countries Trade
(1984, 1994)
ANDEAN  MERCOSUR  NAFIA  EEC  EAST  ASIA  LA
ARG  0.5  1.7  0.9  0.8  0.7  1.3
BOL  2.8  0.1  1.1  0.7  0.2  0.3
BRA  0.4  1.0  0.6  0.8  0.6  0.8
CHL  1.1  0.9  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.2
COL  1.9  0.7  1.4  0.8  0.6  1.5
ECU  1.2  3.7  0.6  4.2  0.4  0.8
MEX  0.8  0.2  1.6  0.3  0.2  0.4
PRY  1.1  0.7  2.1  0.6  0.9  0.8
PER  0.3  0.6  0.4  0.9  0.6  0.6
URY  0.9  1.0  0.7  0.8  0.4  1.1
VEN  0.6  0.2  0.6  0.2  0.3  0.4
ANDEAN  - 0.3  0.8  0.9  0.6  0.7
MERCOSUR  0.4  - 0.6  0.8  0.6  1.0
LA  2.0  2.9  2.3  1.5  1.6  -
Source: Author's  estimates-53-
Annex  3
Determinants  of the Index of Trade Compatibility
The discussion in the text suggests  that the index of compatibility  of a country's
exports with the imports of its trading partners is a function of four major attributes of size
and structure, namely:  (i) the degree of commodity  concentration  of the country's exports;
(ii) the economic size of the country; (iii) the country's wealth; and (iv) the share of
manufacturing  in the economy.  The index of compatibility was asserted to be negatively
related to the first attribute--export concentration;  and positively related to the other three.
This hypothesized  functional  relationship  is tested in this Annex through a regression analysis.
The four explanatory  variables  are represented  in Table 8 in the text:  (i) export
concentration-through the coefficient  of commodity  concentration  of export (see text); (ii)
economic  size-through  the level of the country's aggregate  GDP; (iii) wealth-through  the
level of per-capita GDP; and (iv) the share  of manufacturing-through the proportion of this
sector in GDP.  The dependent  variable-the  index of compatibility  of the country's exports
with its partners' imports-is  derived as follows: First, for each country, the level of the
index with each other individual  country (i.e., all other countries  in the world) is estimated.
Then an (unweighted) average  of these individual indices is calculated,  to yield the
observation  which stands for the country on hand.
The analysis include 44 observations,  referring to the countries  which appeared in
the text's discussions of LAC, Europe, and East Asia and the Pacific: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Costa Rica, Ecuador,  El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay,  Uruguay, and Venezuela;  Belgium, Denmark,-54-
Finland, France, Germany,  Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,  Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the U.K.; Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Japan, Korea, Malaysia,  New Zealand,
the Philippines,  Singapore,  and Thailand; and Canada and the U.S.
The findings of the regression  analysis  are presented in Table A-2.  The suggest
the following  inferences:
Table A-2:  Regression Coefficients
Explanatory  Variable  Coefficient  T-statistic
Constant  .326  4.748
Concentration  of exports  -.587  -5.417
Aggregate  GDP  1  .46E-14  1.167
Per-capita  GDP  8.22E-06  5.383
Share of manufacturing  .461  2.168
Adjusted R 2 .807
D-W statistic  2.137
(1)  The four independent  variable do indeed provide a major explanation  of the level
of the index of trade compatibility: the adjusted R 2 is around .8.  Thus, only minor potential
other explanatory  factors are left out.
(2)  The impacts of the explanatory  variables  are all in the hypothesized  directions: a
negative relationship  between compatibility  and the degree of commodity concentration  of
exports; and positive relationships  with the three other explanatory  attributes.
(3)  The levels of confidence  in the inferences  are indisputably  high for three of the
relationships: with export concentration,  per-capita income,  and the share of manufacturing.
But it is low (only a confidence  level of .25) for the fourth-the  relationship  with the-55-
economic  size of the country.  This may possibly  be due to the presumably high
interrelationships  between this variable and the other three.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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